Abstract. A distributed system is fault-tolerant if it continues to perform correctly even when a subset of the processes becomes faulty. Faulttolerance is highly desirable but often difficult to implement. In this paper, we investigate fault-tolerant synthesis, i.e., the problem of determining whether a given temporal specification can be implemented as a fault-tolerant distributed system. As in standard distributed synthesis, we assume that the specification of the correct behaviors is given as a temporal formula over the externally visible variables. Additionally, we introduce the fault-tolerance specification, a CTL * formula describing the effects and the duration of faults. If, at some point in time, a process becomes faulty, it becomes part of the external environment and its further behavior is only restricted by the fault-tolerance specification. This allows us to model a large variety of fault types. Our method accounts for the effect of faults on the values communicated by the processes, and, hence, on the information available to the non-faulty processes. We prove that for fully connected system architectures, i.e., for systems where each pair of processes is connected by a communication link, the fault-tolerant synthesis problem from CTL * specifications is 2EXPTIME-complete.
Introduction
Fault-tolerance is an important design consideration in distributed systems. A fault-tolerant system is able to withstand situations where a subset of its components breaks: depending on the chosen type of fault-tolerance, the system may completely mask the fault, return to correct behavior after a finite amount of time, or switch to a behavior that is still safe but possibly less performant. Fault-tolerance is highly desirable but often difficult to implement. Thus, formal methods for verification [7] and synthesis [10] of fault-tolerance are necessary.
Traditionally, fault-tolerance requirements are chosen manually. While it is obviously desirable to stay as close as possible to the normal behavior, the question which type of fault-tolerance can be realized in a given system is difficult to decide and requires a careful analysis of both the desired system functionality and the possible faults. In this paper, we develop algorithmic support for this can reduce the distributed synthesis problem for the original architecture and fault-tolerance specification to the one of finding a monolithic implementation that satisfies the transformed specification in the presence of faults.
We hence establish that the synthesis of fault-tolerant distributed systems with fully connected system architectures and external specifications is decidable. In fact, the problem is no more expensive than standard synthesis: fault-tolerant distributed synthesis from CTL * specifications is 2EXPTIME-complete.
Modelling Fault-Tolerant Systems

Faults and Fault-Tolerance
Types of Faults. In the field of fault-tolerant distributed computing faults are categorized in a variety of ways. The categorization of faults according to the behavior they cause, results in several standard classes [3, 1] . Stuck-at faults can, for example, cause a component or a wire to be stuck in some state. If a process is affected by a fail-stop or a crash fault, it stops (potentially permanently) executing any actions before it violates its input-output specification. In both cases the process is uncorrectably corrupted, but while fail-stop faults are detectable, that is, other processes are explicitly notified of the fault, crash stops are undetectable. If a process fails to respond to an input from another component, i.e., some action is omitted, it is said to exhibit an omission fault. Omission faults are a subset of the class of timing faults that cause the component to respond with the correct value but outside the required time interval. The most general class of Byzantine faults encompasses all possible faults, including arbitrary and even malicious behavior of the affected process, and are in general undetectable. According to their duration, faults can be permanent, transient, or intermittent. In the latter two cases, upon recovery the affected process returns to normal operation from the arbitrary state it has reached in the presence of the fault.
Fault-Tolerance Requirements. Usually the system is not required to satisfy the original specification after a fault occurs, but instead comply with some faulttolerance policy. Fault-tolerance properties are generally classified according to whether and how they respect the safety and liveness parts of the original specification. This classification yields three main types of tolerance. Masking tolerance always respects both safety and liveness. In non-masking tolerance, however, the safety property might be temporarily violated, but is guaranteed to be eventually restored, while the liveness part is again always respected. A third type is fail-safe tolerance. When formalizing fail-safe tolerance it is assumed that the original specification is given as conjunction of a safety and a liveness specifications [12] , and after fault occurrence only the safety conjunct has to be satisfied.
Architectures for Fault-Tolerant Synthesis
An architecture describes the communication between the processes in a distributed system and their interaction with the external environment. We model the occurrence of a fault as an action of the environment. In the following, we assume that faults are detectable, that is there exists a reliable unit of the external environment that notifies all processes immediately when a fault occurs in some of them, and also informs them exactly which processes were faulty in the previous execution step. To this end, we consider architectures with a distinguished set of external input fault-notification variables, which all processes in the system are allowed to read. Alternatively, the fault-notification variables could be made invisible to the system processes, in which case finding the fault-detection mechanism would be part of the synthesis problem.
An
is a tuple that consists of: environment env, a finite set of processes P , a set Ext of external variables together with a finite domain D(v) for each v ∈ Ext, a set C (disjoint from Ext) of internal variables, and read and write permissions for each p ∈ P . The set Ext is the union of the disjoint sets I, O, H and N , where:
-The set I consists of the external input variables whose values are supplied by the environment env . The set I is the union of the sets I p , where for each process p, I p is a set of external input variables, this process can read. Each variable in I is read by at least one (possibly several) processes in P .
-The set O consists of the external output variables, via which the processes provide their output to the environment env. The set O is the union of the disjoint sets O p , where for each process p, O p is the set of external output variables written by that process, which no other process in P can read.
-The set H consists of the external private environment variables written by the environment env , and which none of the processes in P can read.
-The set N = {n p , m p | p ∈ P } of external input variables for fault notification contains one variable n p for each process p that is used by the environment to notify all processes for a fault occurrence in p and a variable m p that indicates whether p was faulty in the previous execution step. The variables in N can be read by all processes and are written only by the environment. The domain D(n p ) of n p is a finite subset of N that consists of the different faults that can occur in process p, where 0 indicates normal operation. Similarly for m p .
The set C consists of the variables used for internal communication between the processes. It is the union of the disjoint sets C p , where for each process p, C p is the set of internal variables written by p via which it communicates to the other processes. We denote with V the set of all variables in an architecture A.
For a process p, the set In(p) consists of all variables (internal or external) this process is allowed to read and Out(p) = C p ∪ O p consists of all variables that this process is allowed to write. By definition, the sets Out(p) are disjoint.
The architecture associates with each external variable v ∈ Ext a finite nonempty domain D(v) together with some designated element
The domains of the internal variables are unconstrained by the architecture, and hence the capacity of the communication channels is not limited a priori.
Consider some nonempty finite domains D(v) v∈C for the internal variables in A. We consider synchronous communication with delay: at each step, each process reads its current external input and the output of the processes in P delayed by one step. For a global computation history σ ∈ D(V )
* we have that
is the output of the processes at step j − 1, i.e., the history reflects the delay. Thus, for simplicity of the presentation we have assumed that the delay of each variable v ∈ V \ (I ∪ H ∪ N ) is 1. Our results can be easily extended to the case of arbitrary a priori fixed delays.
Fully Connected
Architectures. An architecture A is fully connected if every pair of processes is connected via a communication link with sufficient capacity.
From now on, we consider only fully connected architectures and w.l.o.g. assume that C = {c p , t p | p ∈ P }, where for each process p, the variables c p and t p are written by p and read by all processes, and the domain of c p is fixed to be D(I p ). Thus, process p can use c p to communicate its input. We denote with c v p the component of the variable c p used for the transmission of v ∈ I p . The domains of the variables t p for p ∈ P are left unspecified in the architecture.
The Specification Language CTL *
Syntax. Let AP be a finite set of atomic propositions. The logic CTL * distinguishes state and path formulas. State formulas are called CTL * formulas. State formulas over AP are formed according to the following grammar, where p ∈ AP and θ stands for a path formula:
Path formulas are formed according to the following grammar, where ϕ is a state formula and θ, θ 1 and θ 2 are path formulas:
As abbreviations we can define the remaining usual boolean operators over state and path formulas. For a path formula θ, we define the state formula Aθ as ¬E¬θ, the path formula Fθ as true U θ and the path formula Gθ as ¬F¬θ.
Trees. As usual, for a finite set X, an X-tree is a prefix-closed subset T ⊆ X * of finite words over X. The direction of every nonempty node σ · x ∈ X + is defined as dir (σ · x) = x, and for ε, dir (ε) = x 0 where x 0 ∈ X is some designated root direction. A X-tree T is called total if ε ∈ T and for every σ ∈ T there exists at least one successor σ · x ∈ T , x ∈ X. If T = X * , then T is called full. For a given finite set Y , a Y -labeled X-tree is a pair T, l , where T is an X-tree and l : T → Y is a labelling function that maps each node in T to an element of Y .
Semantics. Consider a set of variables V with D(V ) being the Cartesian product of their domains. Let AP be a finite set of atomic propositions over V . A CTL
Specifying Fault-Tolerance
The system specification describes the desired input-output behavior of the system in the absence of faults and leaves the internal communication unconstrained. That is, we are given an external specification as a CTL * formula ϕ over atomic propositions from the set AP = {v = a | v ∈ Ext \N, a ∈ D(v)}, i.e., about external variables. The models of ϕ are total D(Ext)-labeled D(Ext)-trees.
In the presence of faults, the system need not satisfy the original specification, but instead comply with some (possibly weaker) fault-tolerance specification. An external specification for an architecture A can refer to the fault notification variables in N . This allows for specifying the intended fault-tolerance policy as well as encoding the effects and durations of faults in the input CTL * formula. Given the original specification ϕ, we first construct a formula Φ T OL according to the required type of fault-tolerance. The user can describe manually as a CTL * formula the desired properties of the behavior of the system in the presence of particular faults in particular processes and combinations thereof. Of course, classical fault-tolerance requirements, such as masking, non-masking or fail-safe, can be also specified (for masking tolerance it suffices to leave the specification unchanged). Moreover, in the case of simple specifications such as invariants, i.e., of the form AGψ, this compilation can be done automatically: For fail-safe and non-masking tolerance, the tolerance properties are respectively AG(ψ ∨ (fault-present ∧ ψ safe )) and AG(ψ ∨ (fault-present ∧ AFAGψ)), where fault-present = p∈P ¬(n p = 0) and ψ safe is the safety conjunct of ψ.
In our model, the occurrence of a fault causes the affected process to behave in an arbitrary way, i.e., it exhibits maximal behavior. However, by constraining this behavior in the fault-tolerance specification, we can model several of the fault types mentioned in the beginning of this section, as well as many more.
Given a set of faults with their effects on the behavior of a process and their durations, we transform the formula ϕ T OL into the fault-tolerance specification Φ t , by relativizing the path quantifiers in the formula ϕ T OL w.r.t. the corresponding assumptions on the environment. These assumptions are encoded in the formulas fault-behavior , fault-duration, and fault-distribution, whose construction we discuss below. Thus, the fault-tolerance specification Φ t is obtained from the formula ϕ T OL by substituting each occurrence of Aθ by A((fault-behavior ∧ fault-duration ∧ fault-distribution) → θ), and each occurrence of Eθ by E(fault-behavior ∧ fault-duration ∧ fault-distribution ∧ θ).
The formula fault-behavior describes the possible behaviors of the processes in the presence of each of the given faults. Let faulty-output(d, p) be a state formula describing the possible outputs of process p when affected by the fault of type d (we can assume that a stopped process outputs some default element ⊥). Then, fault-behavior = G p∈P d∈D(np) (n p = d → X(faulty-output(d, p))).
The formula fault-duration constrains the duration of faults. Let D (n p ) and D (n p ) be the subsets of D(n p ) consisting of the permanent and the transient faults, respectively, for a process p ∈ P . For each d ∈ D (n p ), we assume the existence of a boolean variable r 
state that the occurrence of fault of type d in process p is permanent, respectively transient (i.e., the duration of the fault is finite and the recovered process cannot perturb again, cf. [7] ). Finally, we define the formula fault-duration =
The user can also provide a path formula fault-distribution that constrains the number of faulty processes in the considered system during the execution, e.g., there is at most one faulty process at every point of the execution.
To avoid restriction to only memoryless implementations, we assume that at every point of the system's execution at least one process is not faulty, i.e., the synthesized system is designed to tolerate up to n − 1 simultaneously faulty processes, where n is the total number of processes. Thus, we assume that the formula fault-distribution is a conjunction of the user specified requirements and: the formula G p∈P (n p = 0) which guarantees that there is at least one nonfaulty process at every point, and the formula G p∈P (n p = d → X(m p = d)), which states that the values of the variables m p and n p are correctly related.
Note that for common fault types such as fail-stop or stuck-at, as well as for the usual constraints on the duration of faults, the fault-tolerance specification can be compiled automatically from the original specification. The user can also specify customized requirements expressible in CTL * . From now on, we assume that the fault-tolerance specification is given as input to our algorithm.
Example (Reliable Broadcast).
In a broadcast protocol, the environment consists of n clients E 1 , . . . , E n , which broadcast messages. The system consists of n servers, S 1 , . . . , S n that correspond to the processes p 1 , . . . , p n , which deliver the messages to the clients. Each client E j communicates only with the corresponding server S j and we assume that each message sent by a client is unique. A system with 3 servers is depicted on Fig. 1 , where we have omitted the internal communication variables. Let M be the finite set of possible message contents. The domain of each input, output or communication variable v ∈ {i j , o j , c j | j = 1, 2, 3} is D(v) = {(m, j) | m ∈ M, j ∈ {1, 2, 3}} ∪ {⊥}, where j denotes the broadcaster's name and ⊥ indicates the absence of message.
In the absence of faults, the correctness can be specified by the following standard requirements: (1) If a client E j broadcasts a message m, then the server S j eventually delivers m; (2) If a server delivers a message m, then all servers eventually deliver m; (3) For every message m, every server delivers (m, l) at most once and does so only if m was previously broadcast by the client E l .
The environment component D notifies all servers when a fault in server j occurs, by setting n j to 1. A faulty server sends arbitrary messages to the corresponding client and to the other servers. The duration of faults is unconstrained. Thus, both formulas fault-behavior and fault-duration are equivalent to true.
We specify the fault-tolerance requirement as follows. We replace each requirement that a server eventually delivers a message m by the weaker requirement that it has to eventually deliver a message, provided that from that point on it is never faulty. The safety property that the servers do not invent messages is also weakened to hold only for non-faulty processes. Thus, we obtain a variation of the standard requirements for reliable broadcast from [9] . Validity: If a client E j broadcasts a message m and the corresponding server S j is never faulty from that point on, then S j eventually delivers m.
If a non-faulty server E j delivers a message (m, l), then all servers that are non-faulty from that point on eventually deliver (m, l).
Integrity: For every message m, every non-faulty server E j delivers (m, l) at most once and does so only if m was previously broadcast by the client E l .
The Fault-Tolerant Synthesis Problem
Let A = (env , P, Ext, C, (D(v)) v∈Ext , (In(p), Out(p)) p∈P ) be a fully connected architecture. A distributed implementation for the architecture A consists of a tuple (D(v)) v∈C of sets defining domains for the internal variables and a tuplê s = (s p ) p∈P of implementations for the processes in P , where an implementation for a process p is a function (strategy) s p : D(In(p)) * → D(Out(p)) which maps each local input history for p to an assignment to the variables written by p. A distributed implementationŝ is finite-state if for each process p, the domain D(C p ) is finite and the strategy s p can be represented by a finite automaton.
In the absence of faults, a distributed implementationŝ = (s p ) p∈P defines a computation tree CT (ŝ) = T, dir , where
* is the greatest total tree such that for all σ ∈ D(V ) * and all d ∈ D(V ), if σ · d ∈ T , then σ ∈ T and for every p ∈ P it holds that d Out(p) = s p (σ In(p) ). Recall that the realizability problem for an architecture A with fixed finite domains for all variables and a CTL * specification ϕ over Ext \ N is to decide whether there exists a finitestate distributed implementationŝ for A such that CT (ŝ) |= ϕ. The distributed synthesis problem requires finding such an implementation if one exists.
In the presence of faults, a distributed implementationŝ = (s p ) p∈P defines a fault computation tree FCT (ŝ) = T, dir , where T ⊆ D(V ) * is the greatest total tree such that for all σ ∈ D(V ) * and d ∈ D(V ), if σ · d ∈ T , then σ ∈ T and for every p ∈ P such that dir (σ) n p = 0 it holds that d Out(p) = s p (σ In(p) ), i.e., the output of only non-faulty processes determines the successors of a node.
The implementations for the processes in P should be independent of information about the external environment the processes do not have. Consider an external input variable v ∈ I and assume that at some point all processes allowed to read v are faulty. The behavior of the (non-faulty) processes in P at this and at later points of the execution of the system should not depend on the value of v at that moment, because the faulty processes may communicate the value incorrectly and their states may be arbitrarily perturbed. Thus, we say that two local histories for a process p are equivalent up to faults if they differ only in the values of external input variables at points when all processes reading them were faulty. A distributed implementation is consistent w.r.t. faults if all strategies produce the same output for histories that are equivalent up to faults.
Note that for an implementation that is consistent w.r.t. faults, the output of a strategy for a process p is allowed to depend on the value of a variable v ∈ I p from points in the history in which process p was faulty, as long as some process allowed to read v was not faulty. Thus, provided that at each point of the execution of the system there exists at least one process that is not faulty (an assumption that can be specified in the fault-tolerance specification as shown above), a recovered process is allowed to depend on the history up to equivalence w.r.t. faults. This is possible since in a fully connected architecture a process can, upon recovery from a fault, receive information about the current state of the system from another process that was not faulty at the previous step.
Definition 1 (Equivalence up to faults). For a process p ∈ P , we define the equivalence relation ≡ 
In(p) \ I p and (2) for every v ∈ I p , if there exists a process q ∈ P with v ∈ I q and σ[j] n q = 0, then it holds that
Definition 2 (Consistency w.r.t. faults). We say that a distributed strategŷ s for the architecture A is consistent w.r.t. faults if for every p ∈ P and for every σ 1 and
Definition 3 (Fault-Tolerant Synthesis Problem). The fault-tolerant realizability problem for an architecture A and a CTL * fault-tolerance specification Φ t is to decide whether there exists a finite-state distributed implementationŝ for A that is consistent w.r.t. faults and such that FCT (ŝ) |= Φ t . The fault-tolerant synthesis problem requires finding such an implementation if the answer is yes.
Synthesis
Our synthesis algorithm builds on that of single-process synthesis under incomplete information [11] , via a standard reduction for fully connected architectures and external specifications [8] . We now provide the necessary preliminaries based on the classical synthesis case and in the next sections we present the methodology we developed to employ a similar approach in the fault-tolerant setting.
Synthesis for Fully Connected Architectures
Transmission Delay. In a fully connected architecture, the output of every process p may depend, with a certain delay, on all external input variables in I ∪ N . An input-output function g p is delay-compatible if for each σ 1 , σ 2 ∈ D(I∪N ) * , for which for every v ∈ I ∪N it holds that σ 1 v (|σ 1 |−delay(v, p)) = σ 2 v (|σ 2 |− delay(v, p)), it holds that g p (σ 1 ) = g p (σ 2 ). A global input-output function g is delay-compatible iff so is the projection of g on O p , for every process p ∈ P . Routing Strategies. Given a nonempty set D(v) for each v ∈ C, a routingr = (r p ) p∈P for an architecture A is a tuple of local memoryless strategies, called routing strategies, where for each p ∈ P , r p : D(In(p)) → D(C p ) is a function that given values for the variables in In(p), assigns values to the variables in C p .
In a fully connected architecture A, each process p can transmit the values of I p to the other processes via the variable c p . A simple routingr = (r p ) p∈P is one for which r p (d) c p = d I p and it allows every process to trivially reconstruct the value of every variable in I. A distributed implementationŝ for A has simple routing if for every σ ∈ D(V ) * and p ∈ P it holds that s p (σ In(p) ) c p = dir (σ) I p , i.e., the strategies directly forward the external input. For fully connected architectures it suffices to consider only implementations with simple routing. Synthesis for Fully Connected Architectures and External Specifications. In [8] it was shown that the distributed synthesis problem is decidable for uniformly well-connected architectures with linearly preordered information and external specifications, and it can be reduced to finding a collection of delay-compatible input-output functions for the processes in P . Fully connected architectures are a special case of uniformly well-connected architectures in which all processes have the same information and hence fall in this class. Moreover, in order to find such a collection of input-output functions, it suffices to find a delay-compatible global input-output function and use projection to obtain functions for the processes in P . Thus, the problem reduces to the single-process synthesis problem under incomplete information with the additional requirement of delay-compatibility.
Single-Process Synthesis under Incomplete Information
Let A = (env , {p}, Ext, ∅, (D(v)) v∈Ext , (I ∪ N, O)) be a single-process architecture and ψ be a CTL * specification over the variables in V = I ∪ H ∪ N ∪ O.
